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Convicting the Innocent
In the New York case of Campbell v. State,' claimant, who had
been erroneously convicted of the crime of forgery in the second
degree, was awarded $115,000 as damages for suffering, humiliation,
deprivation of liberty and civil rights, and loss of earnings. The
award covered the seven and one-half year period from his arrest
until his pardon by the Governor of the State of New York. Three
and one-half years of this time were spent in prison and the remain-
der on parole.
Campbell, a securities salesman, was arrested in 1938 due to
his supposed similarity in appearance to the person guilty of passing
numerous forged checks in the New York City area. He was convicted
and sentenced to a five to ten year term in prison largely on the basis
of positive identification by officers and employees of the banks
upon whom the forgeries were perpetrated. 2 After serving forty
months of his sentence Campbell was paroled, remaining on parole
until the actual forger, one Alexander L. Thiel, apprehended by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1945, confessed to the crimes
for which Campbell was convicted. Following Campbell's pardon
on the ground of innocence, the state legislature passed a special
act conferring jurisdiction on the New York Court of Claims to
determine his claim against the state for damages.3
In surveying the problems of erroneous convictions, Professor
Borchard collected sixty-five such cases. 4 In twenty-nine of these
the mistake mainly responsible for the conviction was in identifica-
tion; in eight of the twenty-nine, the criminal and the wrongfully
accused person bore no resemblance to one another, and in twelve
others the resemblance was not close. 5 A case quite similar to the
principal one and falling into the category of remote resemblance
was Commonwealth v. Andrews.6 There, because of the identifica-
tion by seventeen persons, the accused was convicted of uttering
bad checks. 3ut during and after Andrews' trial, similar bad
checks continued to be passed in the vicinity, and this led to the
apprehension of the real forger who confessed to the utterances of
which Andrews was convicted. In the principal case, however, a
162 N.Y.S. (2d) 638 (1946).
2People v. Campbell, Court of General Sessions, County of New
York, Calendar No. 77716-1938, Indictment No. 216,422.
3 New York Laws 1946, c. 1, §§1, 2.
4 Borchard, Convicting the Innocent (1932).
5 Id. at xiii.
6 Superior Court of Suffolk County, Massachusetts (1913). Discussed
in Borchard, cit. supra note 4, at 1.
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similar repetition of forgeries failed to avail Campbell as it had
Andrews. 7
Another striking analogy of the Campbell to the Andrews case
lies in the lack of similarity between the accused persons and the
actual culprits,8 which emphasizes the unreliability of recollective
identification.9 It was Dean Wigmore's contention that no part of
the field of proof has been so defective in its use of psychology as
the identification of accused persons on arrest. Commenting upon
press dispatches which stated that when police arrested a man sus-
pected of robbing the wife of the mayor of Chicago, they took the
handcuffed suspect to her home to be identified, Wigmore remarked,
"The suggestion of guilty identity could not have been more
violent."' 0
The procedure employed in bringing about the identification of
Campbell was scarcely less violent in its suggestiveness than Wig-
more's Chicago case. At public hearings conducted by the New
York Criminal Courts Bar Association, three witnesses testified
that prior to the identification of Campbell in the Attorney Gen-
eral's office following his arrest, they were shown a picture of
Campbell on which a moustache had been superimposed and were
given persuasive information that Campbell was the "front" man
for a big forgery ring which bank employees must work together
to exterminate. They also testified that Campbell was pointed out
to them beforehand and that the identification occurred without the
suspect being placed in any group or line-up."
It would seem that the minimum requirements of fairness and
accuracy, and adherence to the most elementary of psychological
principles, dictate a more scientific and uniform method of identifi-
cation procedure. The method of presenting the suspect in a line-up
of several other men of similar dress and appearance is the most
satisfactory yet suggested from the standpoint of fairness and
practicability.' 2 The process should be carefully supervised by un-
7 A report on the public hearing conducted by the New York County
Criminal Courts Bar Association in the Bertram M. Campbell Investiga-
tion, New York Post, August 28, 1945: "Asst. U.S. Atty. Donovan, the
final witness testified that the FBI in 1930 began investigating what
they called the 'Mr. X Forgeries,' one of which was the crime for which
Campbell was imprisoned. The FBI investigation went on after his
conviction, Donovan said, and more 'Mr. X' forged checks continued to
turn up until February, 1944."
8 The resemblance in the Andrews case was characterized as "not
close." Borchard, cit. supra note 4, at 5. In the Campbell case, aside
from the fact that both men wore moustaches and both were middle-aged,
no points of similarity between Campbell and Thiel were discernible.
Campbell was taller and larger-proportioned than Thiel, his complexion
was ruddy as compared with the rather sallow complexion of Thiel.
A picture of the two persons standing side by side appeared in the
magazine section of the New York Sunday Mirror, July 28, 1945.
9 See, upbn this point, the very interesting case reported in Sanders,
The Danger of Direct Evidence (1946) 19 The Police Journal (England)
314. The reported case occurred in Colorado.
10 Wigmore, Identification of Accused Persons on Arrest (1931) 25
Ill. L. Rev. 550, at 551.
21 Interim and Partial Report, Bertram M. Campbell Investigation,
New York County Criminal Courts Bar Association (1946) p. 40.
12 More complex, though undoubtedly more accurate, methods in-
volving use of vocal motion-pictures portraying persons of similar ap-
pearance in several different poses, with push-button identification, have
been suggested by Wigmore, supra note 10, at 552, and Krosnick, Movie-
tone Goes to Court (1930), 1 Am. Jour. of Police Science 521.
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biased persons to prevent "coaching," and the observers should be
isolated to assure that their conclusions will be reached unpersuaded
by suggestions of others.' 3
A significant sequel to the erroneous conviction of Campbell
occurred in the case of People v. Coughlinl4 where a man posing in
the New York City area as a collection agent for a worthy enter-
prise fraudulently secured money from numerous people. The de-
fendant was arrested, and upon trial was identified by several
persons who had been swindled. After the defendant's conviction,
when the collections continued, the district attorney oydered a study
of handwriting on the receipts which the swindler issued, as this
had not been done at trial. The positive opinions of experts that
the convicted man had not written the receipts led to a re-opening
of the case and an acquittal.
When pre-trial handwriting comparisons in the Campbell case
revealed that Campbell could not have written the forged instru-
ments, the state conveniently, if quite illogically, shifted to the
theory that the accused was not the "scratch" man but the "front"
man for a forgery syndicate.I5 Presumably, too, he was a sleight-
of-hand artist who switched checks and signature cards before the
bankers' eyes. The value of the impersonal and reliable process of
handwriting identification as an offset to the unreliability of per-
sonal identification was thus dissipated by an apparently fixed
presumption of guilt.
It is highly questionable whether any reasonable grounds for
suspicion of Campbell existed initially. When the actual forger
(Thiel) opened the account at the bank, he subjected himself to
the customary inquiries in order to establish his identity as the
man whom he was impersonating. In filling in the telephone num-
ber on the signature cards he inadvertently wrote Whitehall 4-2657
rather than the correct number, Whitehall 4-2567. The incorrect
number happened to correspond to the phone of an office at which
Campbell occasionally called. 16 Police watching the office saw Camp-
bell and concluded that he answered the description given them of
the forger (i.e. Thiel). The police theory must have been that
Campbell, instead of giving a telephone number that pointed away
from him, was so careless as to provide the police with a clue
leading to his apprehension. Apparently no credence was given to
the obvious theory that the criminal, relying necessarily on his
memory (since it might have aroused suspicion had he referred
to a memorandum to ascertain his own phone number), mistakenly
interchanged %he digits.
Campbell's only conceivable connection with a forgery ring, the
main theory of the state, was a business acquaintance with a person
13 At the public hearing for the Campbell Investigation, cit. supra
note 11, a bank teller testified that he first saw Campbell while waiting
in the ante-room of the Attorney-General's office without recognizing
him. Later in the office, after the bank president and his secretary had
identified Campbell, he said that he too recognized the accused man.
New York Sun, August 25, 1945.
14 Court of Special Sessions, Bronx County, New York (1940). Dis-
cussed by Stein, Proof of Handwriting and Typewriting (1941) 31
J. Crim. L. 637.
15 See note 11 supra at 11. The crime of forgery in the second
degree for which Campbell was convicted consists of "uttering" forged
Instruments.16 See note 11 supra at 15.
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who had once been a forger. At the trial it was shown that the
accused was unaware of this man's past record, and the ex-forger
admittedly was not connected with the crime for which Campbell
was prosecuted.1 7 Of two prior forgeries committed by the actual
culprit (Thiel), one occurred three years before the offense for
which Campbell was tried. The state decided not to prosecute Camp-
bell for this latter crime because of his formidable alibi, 8 but such
crimes were nevertheless used as evidence against him for the
purpose of showing a common scheme on the part of Campbell and
his anonymous associates. There was no appeal from Campbell's
conviction,19 although exception was duly taken to what might have
been considered reversible error in permitting remarks of prosecu-
tor on summation to the effect that defendant's first counsel, who
became ill during the trial, withdrew because Campbell had lied
to him.
20
What portion of responsibility should attach to Campbell's defense
counsel for failure to expose the flimsiness of the state's case,2 1 and
what portion should attach to the court and to the specially selected
"blue-ribbon" jury for their failure to perceive it for themselves
is a highly conjectural and futile inquiry.2 The remark of the
court on passing sentence that it must take into account "the very
17 See note 11 supra at 17.
18 In May, 1935, when this crime was committed, Campbell was
working in the Nassau County Welfare Department where he was re-
quired to punch a time-clock showing when he came to work and when
he left. His record during that month showed no absences. The indict-
ment (No. 216,746-1938) charging him with this crime was dismissed,
but the court in passing sentence upon Campbell, said it was taking
this previous indictment into consideration. People v. Campbell, supra
note 2 (steno. minutes 322).
19 Presumably because of lack of funds. Counsel for the Bertram
M. Campbell Investigation, supra note 12, estimated that the minimum
expense, exclusive of attorney's fees, for taking an appeal would have
been $525.00. The report of the investigation recommended legislation
requiring appellate review without printed record for indigent defendants
where the attorney certifies he is appealing without fee in the interest
of justice.20 Daru, For Sale - Short Prison Sentences, Magazine Digest,
January, 1946. The author, who conducted the public hearings in the
Campbell Investigation, supra note 11, deplores the use of carefully
planned publicity and court room tactics to build up the prosecutor as a
sort of super-sleuth who possesses knowledge of the case apart from
the evidence adduced at trial. At strategic moments, the prosecutor,
capitalizing upon this reputation and his position as a public officer
imparts such "information" to the jury.
It has been considered reversible error for counsel in argument to
state as fact something not in the record, particularly if the comment
is inclined to be inflammatory or abusive. Rossi v. U.S., 9 F. (2d) 362(C.C.A. 9th, 1925) ; People v. Malkin, 250 N.Y. 185, 164 N.E. 900 (1928).
21It was the conclusion of the Interim and Partial Report, supra
note 12 at 35, that Campbell was competently defended.
22 One of the repercussions of this case was the introduction of a
bill before the New York General Assembly to abolish the special jury
system-Bill No. 726, entitled "An Act to Repeal Article 18-B of the
Judiciary Law." Article 18-B provides that the district attorney or
defendant may apply in a criminal case for a special jury to try issues
of fact. Where it appears that the efficient administration of justice
will be augmented by the trial by special jury, the court may make an
order so directing. No specific standards are set out in the statute as
to the education or employment qualifications of such jurors. The county
clerk apparently has much discretion in selecting the panel, and the
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rank perjury committed during the trial of this case," 23 indicates
that the judge and the jury were equally convinced of the accused's
guilt.
The State of New York responded generously in attempting to
rectify the wrong done to Campbell, although unfortunately he
lived only a short while after the claim was adjudicated. 24 But the
instances in which the public conscience is shocked to such actions
are rare and are dependent upon the too fortuitous circumstances
of notoriety accorded by the press and the consequent ability of
claimants to persuade legislatures to provide indemnity.25 Special
legislation such as was employed in the Campbell case should not
be necessary, for some compensation for all such innocent victims
can be assured by statutory provision. Thus far, however, only
three states, California, Wisconsin and North Dakota have provided
by statute for the arbitration of such claims against the state by
administrative boards. 26
ROBERT S. MORRIS.
intent appears to be to select persons of higher than average intelligence
who are less likely to be biased by newspaper stories and better able to
handle intricate factual issues.
The United States Supreme Court has this term granted certiorari
in the case of People v. Fay, 296 N.Y. 510, 68 N.E. 453 (1946), where
the New York Court of Appeals held that the decision of the trial court
in granting the motion of the people for a special jury and in overruling
defendant's challenge to the special jury panel was not a denial of due
process under the 14th Amendment. The Supreme Court has recently
held in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Company, - U.S.-, 66 S. Ct. 984(1946), that the systematic exclusion of daily wage earners from the
jury list was error requiring reversal in the exercise of the Supreme
Court's power of supervision over administration of justice in federal
eourts. But this holding apparently has no application to process in
state courts, and in any event the decision was not reached on constitu-
tional grounds and probably exceeded due process requirements. See
Note (1946) 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1167.
23 People v. Campbell, supra note 2 (steno minutes 322).
24 Of the $115,000 awarded, $40,000 was for loss of earnings for the
seven and one-half years from arrest until pardon. The remaining
$75,000 was compensation for suffering, humiliation and deprivation of
liberty and civil rights.
Mental pain and suffering is an element of compensatory as dis-
tinguished from exemplary damages, Adams v. Stockton, (Kansas City
Court of Appeals) 133 S.W. (2d) 687 (1939), Gillespie v. Brooklyn
Heights, 178 N.Y. 347, 70 N.E. 857 (1904), and in any event the latter
may not be recovered against the state. Tierney v. State, 178 Misc. 421,
266 App. Div. 623 (1943).25 Other statutory awards: Purvis, $5,000, Laws of Mississippi 1920
ch. 20; Phillion, $5,000, Utah, Laws 1931 c. 64, p. 271; Brown, General
Laws of Flor'ia, 1929, I 1063-1064.26Califorra Penal Code (1941) §§ 4900-4906; Wisconsin Statutes
1943, Chapter 285, §285.05; North Dakota Revised Code of 1943,
Vol. 1, §§12-5701-5706. In California the finding of the Board of
Control becomes a recommendation for appropriation to the state legis-
lature. The finding operates as a judgment against the state payable
by the state treasurer in Wisconsin and North Dakota. While the boards
are limited in awards to $5,000, there is actually no maximum recovery
set in any of the above states, although to obtain greater compensation,
an enabling act as in Campbell v. State would be required.
